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The Progressive Critique
of the Current Socio-legal Landscape:
Corporations and Racial Justice∗
Cheryl I. Harris1
I have the honor of serving as the director of the Critical Race Studies
Concentration at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.
Over the past decade in teaching, as well as in my prior life as an attorney, I
have spent a lot of time thinking, writing, and talking about race. I have
spent relatively little time thinking about the issue of corporations. I am
new to this conversation and I would describe myself as not necessarily
fully bilingual.
What I want to offer here are maybe just some tentative thoughts, perhaps
more reflections on the topic, in terms of thinking about the relationship
between corporations and racial justice.
I begin by placing my remarks in the context of my teaching experiences.
I teach constitutional law and employment discrimination. Both courses are
concerned with the issues of equality. One deals with the basic framework
of the Constitution of the United States,2 while the other deals with a
statute, specifically Title VII, which bans discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, and disability in the workplace.3
In viewing corporations and racial equality through the lens of these two
bodies of law, one could say that you get a very complex and contradictory
picture in terms of the relationship between corporations and racial justice.
On one hand, one could look through the lens of a particular kind of story
about constitutional law and see the corporation as a form of organized
capital that is infinitely about wealth maximization—a way of diffusing
ownership and responsibility by spreading wealth and risk. And through
this kind of entity of modernization and progress there is a story in which
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one could say that corporations have opposed racial inequality as inherently
inefficient, backwards, and out of step with what it takes to build capital.
There is also a story in which private property and capitalism in the free
markets generate racial progress. This is a story that corporations like to
highlight and one that has both old and new versions in terms of
constitutional law.
The old version of the story is one than can be told through Plessy v.
Ferguson.4 Plessy involved a Louisiana statute that mandated segregation
in intrastate railroad travel. It required the state to provide equal but
separate accommodations on the basis of race for all railroads traveling
through the State of Louisiana.5
The lawyers and activists who saw the law adopted in 1890 correctly
recognized it as yet another step in the effort to dismantle the progress that
had been made during Reconstruction.6 So, they sought to band together
and set up a test case.7
One of the principal lawyers in the case, who looked at cases prior to
Plessy in an attempt to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, correctly
understood that the court was going to be very hostile to an equal protection
claim. Looking at the cases preceding Plessy, it was very clear that the
court had no interest in making a robust interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would be friendly to an argument that said separation on
the basis of race violated equal protection.8
Reading the trend in the court’s decisions, the lawyer decided to speak a
language that they understood and embraced, and that was the language of
property.9 Albion Tourgée, one of the lawyers on the case, argued that the
challenger in the case should be white.10 In other words, the person put up
to challenge the law in Plessy should have been a person who appeared to
be white; that is, the person should have been phenotypically white, so that
the train conductor’s assignment of that person to a car reserved for blacks
could be challenged on the grounds that it was a deprivation of property.11
That is, assigning a person that looked to be white to a train car reserved for
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those being black was, in fact, depriving that person of the reputation of
being regarded as white.12
The case then proceeded on two theories: one, an argument of equal
protection; and two, an argument about deprivation of property.13 Of
course, as you would know, neither argument was successful. So why am I
telling this story?
I am telling this story because in order for the law in Plessy to be
challenged and in order for Plessy to be utilized in this way, there had to be
a test case. In order for there to be a test case, there had to be an arrest. In
order for Plessy to be arrested, since he phenotypically appeared to be a
white man, somebody had to communicate to local authorities that this guy
was about to break the law by getting on the wrong train car and therefore,
needed to be arrested. If this is the case, then how did local authorities
know?
Local authorities knew of this case because it was a test case arranged
with the railroad’s cooperation.14 The attorneys went to the railroads and
basically sought out one that would agree to a test case.15 Now, in 1896,
why would the railroads agree to a test case? From the railroad’s
perspective, one of the stories that is told about Plessy is that this is an
instance in which race discrimination was economically burdensome;16 that
is, it was economically inefficient to have to maintain separate cars.17 In
addition, it was particularly inefficient because depending on what state you
were in, a particular fraction of so-called black blood determined whether a
person was considered black.18 If you crossed the state from one to another,
a person that is classified as black in State A may not have been classified
as black in State B.19
One of the stories told about Plessy is one in which you see the market,
or the free market, as a force that is resisting racial discrimination in the
name of economic progress. In this story, racial segregation and later
discrimination is economically inefficient.
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The contemporary version of this story can be told by looking at Grutter
v. Bollinger20 and Gratz v. Bollinger.21 These are the two affirmative action
cases that came down in 2003 in which the University of Michigan’s
admissions policy was challenged on the grounds that it violated the equal
protection clause. One thing that is interesting in these cases is an amicus
brief filed by none other than General Motors.22 General Motors filed on
behalf of the University of Michigan and, along with some Fortune 500
companies, made an interesting argument in their amicus brief.
“General Motors employs 388,000 people, including 193,000 in the
United States [with annual revenues exceeding $175 billion].”23 General
Motors situates itself as a major global player. I find this interesting
because they are always talking about GM bleeding money, as though it is
on the ropes. $175 billion.
General Motors filed an amicus brief and it said the reason it filed the
brief was
to explain that the Nation’s interest in safeguarding the freedom of
academic institutions to select racially and ethnically diverse
student bodies is compelling: the future of American business and,
in some measure, of the American economy depends on it. . . .
[O]nly a well educated, diverse work force, comprising people
who have learned to work productively and creatively with
individuals from a multitude of races and ethnic, religious, and
cultural backgrounds, can maintain America’s competitiveness in
the increasingly diverse and interconnected world economy. [The
maintenance of global markets requires the development of
business elites that have acquired cross-cultural skills].24
What we see here is the corporate articulation of racial justice as good
business; that is, that cross-cultural competence is crucial in serving global
markets.25 Again the story is one in which a major corporate power aligns
itself with racial justice in the interest of diversity because diversity is
economically rational and wealth maximizing. Of course, that is not the
whole story.
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If we take a look at the corporation through the lens of employment
discrimination law, we see quite a different face. We see pervasive and
rampant racial discrimination in both overt and subtle forms. The overt
may be known to many of you. One case in particular involved RR
Donnelly, a printing press in Chicago that closed a south-side plant in 1994.
Over six hundred black employees sued,26 alleging that there had been
systemic racial discrimination in many forms, including the misuse of
temporary employment policies that allowed people to work for twentythree months, one month short of the two years required to become
permanent employees and secure health benefits. Instead of hiring the
employees, the company would lay them off.27 There were also charges of
a racially hostile work environment; that is, supervisors failed to intervene
when black workers were harassed.28 One employee told a story about
being forced to eat his lunch out of a garbage can.29 There were Ku Klux
Klan symbols30 and nooses31 all around.
Similar allegations about denial of opportunity and hostile work
environments have been made at Kodak, BellSouth, Texaco, and Sodexho,
which is a food service giant affiliated with Marriott.32 Interestingly,
Sodexho has taken on the contracts for food services at many universities
and colleges across the country.33
A 2002 study published by Alfred and Ruth Blumrosen, at Rutgers
University, points out that discrimination is pervasive in the workplace.34
Looking at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
reports from 1995 to 1999, the EEOC reports indicate that while there have
been significant gains for racial minorities in terms of jobs and positions,
nearly 40 percent of the 200,000 companies studied discriminated against
racial minorities in at least one occupational category.35 Both researchers
were looking at underutilization, such as situations where there were clearly
qualified racial minorities being underutilized in companies.36
Blumrosen estimates that this intentional job discrimination affected over
two million workers among large and medium sized employers.37 Among
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these employers, 22,000 were characterized as severe and were found
responsible for approximately one-half of all intentional discrimination.38
To put it bluntly, the prevailing idea that intentional job discrimination is
a thing of the past or the acts of a few isolated companies is simply wrong.
Yet the idea that affirmative action is no longer necessary has taken hold
because of these assumptions. In some people’s minds, affirmative action
amounts to some kind of overcorrection.
At the same time, through the lens of employment discrimination law, we
see this pervasive pattern of employment discrimination by corporate actors
as both the law and the courts have become more hostile to employment
discrimination claims.39 Employment discrimination law has been an uphill
battle for about the last twenty years.40 And several academics have tried to
take an empirical look, and what they found is pretty scary. At the pretrial
stage, 80–95 percent of employment cases have been decided for
defendants.41 That is, at the summary judgment level you are out the
door—that is it. We can compare that with 66 percent of insurance cases in
which defendants have received a summary judgment in their favor.42
Similarly, in California a study was done which indicated that
employment discrimination cases are very hard to win, and when you
exclude sexual harassment cases from the data, it even shows that those
cases are much harder to win. In other words, sexual harassment cases are
not easy to win, but they are easier to win than race discrimination cases.
According to a study by David Oppenheimer, “the discrimination cases
that are hardest to win are hardest to win when brought by non-whites and
particularly black women alleging race discrimination and women over
forty alleging race discrimination.”43 God forbid that you should be a black
woman over forty.44 You are dead.
Non-whites also do dramatically worse on appeal.45 When employers
win at the trial level, only 5.8 percent of their judgments are reversed on
appeal.46 When plaintiffs win at the trial level, 43.6 percent of their
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judgments are reversed on appeal. So, even if you manage to get through
those hurdles and get a trial verdict, it is not safe from the appellate court.
In addition to the question of hostility to the courts, we also see the
corporate actors as major players in resisting any sort of changes in antidiscrimination law that might change some of these statistics. The history
of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, which amended Title VII,
includes the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc.
v. Atonio.47 This case shows one of the more stark cases of employment
discrimination that emerges out of contemporary American legal lore
involving a cannery in Alaska which had a very isolated work area.48 This
particular workforce was predominantly made up of Asian and white
people.49 In the workforce, the whites had all the managerial positions, all
the skill craft positions, and Asians were relegated to line work.50 In this
work environment, because it was seasonal work, the line workers had
separate cafeterias and living quarters from the managers, creating a
plantation kind of orientation or organization of the living space.51
The Supreme Court in Wards Cove said the work environment in the
cannery did not violate Title VII.52 It did not amount to disparate impact.53
It did not amount to disparate treatment.54 For those of us that are old
enough to remember the senior President Bush, he argued, along with all of
his corporate sponsors, that any amendments in the law amounted to an
attempt to institute a quota bill.55 The magic language of quota was thrown
around as the corporate powers resisted any efforts to strengthen antidiscrimination law.
What is my point? What explains this seeming contradiction between the
corporate commitment to diversity on the one hand that we see in Grutter,56
and the simultaneous face of blatant, as well as more subtle, forms of job
discrimination? In part, I think this contradiction actually inheres in the
very structure of our equality discourse from the beginning.
If we take a look at the Fourteenth Amendment and the language and the
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, what does it do? First, the
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language within the Fourteenth Amendment says, “No state shall
[discriminate].”57 The language of the Fourteenth Amendment on its face
sets up this dichotomy between public and private power in which only
public power is subject to the reach of the equal protection guarantee.58 It
carves out the entire domain of private power, corporations, as being
beyond the reach of constitutional law.
Now, of course, we have reached to some extent into that domain through
the statutory mechanism of Title VII. But that is clearly not enough and
clearly subject to the political money that the other speakers have talked
about. Not only was corporate power left out of the picture right from the
very beginning, but the early Fourteenth Amendment cases extended the
protection of the amendment to corporations which were declared to be
Fourteenth Amendment persons, right?
In other words, corporations are Fourteenth Amendment persons.59 They
are entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 This is
happening at the same time that the court is essentially gutting the
Fourteenth Amendment of any meaning in terms of its protections for
racially subordinated people. This leaves the private domain free of
regulation.
That fundamental omission basically means that racial justice is subject
to the corporate determination of when racial justice converges with its
economic interest. It explains why a corporation could sign on to a brief in
Grutter because it is diversity that it is advancing, not the eradication of
present racial discrimination, which it does not acknowledge anywhere.61
Anywhere. There is nothing in that brief that would give you the remotest
sign that any of these corporate actors have been hauled into court, maybe
successfully or not, but hauled into court for this kind of rampant and
blatant discrimination.
What does that leave us with? That leaves us with a need to disrupt the
separation between public and private power. At the heart of what we are
talking about is a set of arrangements in which private corporate power has
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been given carte blanche. I think that at the end of the day what we need to
recognize is that some of this stuff is not just about tinkering at the edges. I
think, as some of the speakers have mentioned, we are talking about
fundamental restructuring. And part of it has to do with really rethinking
our understanding of the relationship between public and private
empowerment and race.
∗
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